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F.: View by a Judge Sitting in Lieu of a Jury
STUDENT NOTES

no par value. This plan might be attacked on the same ground as
was mentioned above, but there should not be any valid objection
to no-par stock. Under the present West Virginia law, perhaps, the
best way to achieve the result previously accomplished by nonvoting
stock would be to issue debentures without definite maturities, with
cumulative interest, and deferred to ordinary creditors. Nothing
new would be created, as modem preferred stocks are becoming
more and more like unsecured debts, but if these papers were called
shares, they could vote, but because they are called debentures, they
could not vote.38
In 1958, the voters of West Virginia will vote on a proposed
amendment to article XI, section 4 of the state constitution. If this
amendment is approved by the people, section 4 will read: "The
Legislature shall provide by law that every corporation, other than
a banking institution, shall have power to issue one or more classes
and series within classes of stock, with or without par value, with
full, limited or no voting powers ... .,"34 This proposed amendment
has no retroactive provision so that it appears that corporations in
existence prior to the adoption thereof, with charters containing
provisions limiting the powers of stockholders to vote, will not be
aided by the proposed amendment unless additional legislation is
passed.
P. B. H.
VIEW BY A JUDGE SrTT=G In Lixu OF A JURY

As stated by Dean Thomas P. Hardman in his article on the
evidentiary effect of views,' the question whether a judge may have
a view and whether what the judge observes upon a view is usable
as substantive evidence, has never been judicially decided in West
Virginia. However, recently in the case of Westover Volunteer Fire
Department v. Barker,2 hereinafter referred to as the principal case,
the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia was, to a very
limited extent, presented with those questions. Because there are
today a great number of cases in which the judge sits as the trier
of fact and there are statements of the court in the aforementioned
33 Note, 17

I.. L. REv. 188, 148 (1922).
4Senate Bill No. 251.

3

1 Hardman, The Evidentiary Effect of a View: Stare Decisb or Stare
DictisP, 53 W.

VA. L. REv. 103 n.3 (1951).
2 95 S.E.2d 807 (W. Va. 1956).
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case from which it is felt that erroneous inferences could possibly
be drawn, although the court expressly limited its decision, it is
important that comment be made upon the case and upon some of
the questions which were raised, at least, inferentially.
The principal case was a statutory proceeding to establish a
disputed boundary line between coterminus owners of real estate.3
This proceeding was on the law side of the court and tried before
the judge acting in lieu of a jury. The judge, as disclosed from his
written opinion which was made a part of the record, on his own
volition viewed the premises in controversy, without the consent of
the parties, or their attorneys, and decided the case in favor of
the petitioner "solely upon his view". The Supreme Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the circuit court and entered judgment
for the defendant, the judgment that should have been entered
4
below.
The Supreme Court of Appeals, per Riley J., noted at the beginning of the opinion that "there is no statutory authority for a trial
judge trying a case in lieu of a jury, to take a view." 5 As one of
the "prophecies of what the courts will do in fact,"6 it might be
said by some that this is an expression of the court that there is no
authority (statutory or common law) for a judge to take a view.
However, the court later states that the judge "may have acted
within the inherent power of the court over which he presides (a
question which we do not need to decide). . . ."7 Therefore, from
the opinion taken as a whole, it is very clear that the court is not
deciding nor is it indicating its position on whether or not the judge
has the inherent power to take a view in a proper case in the absence
of express statutory authorization.
Concerning this last mentioned question, Professors Wigmore
and McCormick agree that the judicial power to order a view by
the judge acting as the trier of fact (or the jury) is an inherent
power of the court at common law.8 There are decisions in the
3 The case was instituted under the provisions of W. VA. CODE c. 55, art.
4, § 31 (Michie 1955).
4 Westover Volunteer Fire Department v. Barker, 95 S.E.2d 807 (W. Va.
1956).
5 Id. at 810.
6 This is one theory of what the law is. See Holmes, The Path of the Law,
10 HxAuv. L. REv. 457, 461 (1897); Hardman, supra note 1, at 104-106.
7 95 S.E.2d 807, 811 (W. Va. 1956).
8See 4 WsoIsoR, EVIDENCE §§ 1169, 1163, 1162 (3d ed. 1940); McCowmncK, EvmENcE § 188 (1954).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol59/iss4/13

2

F.: View by a Judge Sitting in Lieu of a Jury

STUDENT NOTES
United States which substantiate this position relying upon the
common law precedents. 9 Professor Wigmore further states that
the statutes regulating the subject, which began over two centuries
ago in England, were concerned with the details of the process
rather than the limits of the power, and that statutes regulate the
process in almost every jurisdiction in the United States, but "the
judicial power to order a view exists independently of any statutory
limitation". 1° With this proposition in mind, a study of the only
statute in West Virginia on views" (recognizing jury views) indicates that the legislative intent and purpose in passing the statute
was simply to regulate how this inherent common law power of
the court, was to be exercised by requiring a view to be a judicial
proceeding. There is nothing in this statute which would lead one
to reasonably conclude that its purpose was to abolish all views
except those specifically authorized, but rather, the statute appears
to regulate jury views so as to prevent the evils arising from unregulated jury views, 12 and there appears to be good reasons for such
regulation. 13 Evidently, at early common law views were sometimes
not conducted under judicial supervision. Under such an interpretation of our statute then all the inherent common law powers of the
court not so specifically regulated, would still exist just as they did at
common law, including the power of the court when sitting in lieu
9 Springer v. Chicago, 185 IM.552, 26 N.E. 514 (1891); State v. Perry, 121
N.C. 533, 27 S.E. 997 (1897). See note 8 supra and cases cited by those
authorities.
10 4 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 1163.
11W. VA. CODE c. 56, art. 6, § 17 (Michie 1955) which provides, "The
jury may, in any case, at the request of either party, be taken to view the
premises or place in question, or any property, matter or thing relating to the
controversy between the parties, when it shall appear to the court that such
view is necessary to a just decision, and in such case the judge presiding at the
trial may go with the jury and control the proceedings; and in a felony case the
judge and the clerk shall go with the jury and the judge shall control the proceedings, and the accused shall likewise be taken with the jury or, if under
recognizance, shall attend the view and his recognizance shall be construed
to require such attendance. The party making the motion, in a civil case, shall
advance a sum sufficient to defray the expenses of the jury and the officers who
attend them in taking the view, which expenses shall be afterwards taxed like
other legal costs."
12 See 6 WIGmoE, EVIDENCE § 1802, for instances where matters learned

by the jury upon a view violated the hearsay rule.
is If this West Virginia statute on views were interpreted by the courts as
being in derogation of the common law, which it appears that it is, then it
should be strictly construed and under a strict construction, the statute would
be limited to the situations expressly stated-views by juries. See 17 MIcME's
JURISPRUDENCE OF VIRGNIA AND WEST VmGINIA, Statutes, § 70 (1950), for
cases involving the construction of statutes which are in derogation of the
common law.
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of a jury, to order a view in a proper case. 14 However, there are
some courts which have held that in the absence of statutory authorization of a view by a judge sitting in lieu of a jury, the court
does not have the power to order such a view, 15 but those courts
appear to be subject to the following criticism by Professor Wigmore
(in speaking of views in a criminal case):
"Some Judges seem to acquire, after mounting the Bench, a
subservience towards the Legislature in matters concerning
solely the Court's own constitutional powers and responsibilities. If no statute has told them how to perform their duty
in some novel or unusual situation, they feel helpless, but if a
statute can be found, they suddenly feel able to act. It is impossible to see why the Court's power to aid the investigation
of truth by directing a view should be restricted ....
better precedents accept this doctrine." 16

and the

Another acceptable approach to this question, (although it is
felt here that the above reasoning is better under the West Virginia
statute on views), is that "a judge sitting in lieu of a jury may have
a view" in Massachusetts where, as in West Virginia, the only pertinent statutory provision purports to authorize a view by the jury,
or by jury and judge, but is silent as to a view by a judge sitting
without a jury. In holding that a judge sitting without a jury could
take a view of the scene under such a statute, the Massachusetts
court said:
"The power to inform itself by a view, within or without the
territory of its jurisdiction, is inherent in a court at common
law. Wigmore, Evidence § 1162, 1163, and notes thereto....
In this commonwealth the power is conferred by statute, G.L.
(Ter. Ed.) c. 234, § 35, upon courts sitting with juries in language broad enough to avoid any implication that it is confined
to jury cases and to courts which sit with juries. See Madden
v. Boston Elevated By., 284 Mass. 490, 188 N.E. 234 (1933)."17
Even if the trial judge acting in lieu of a jury may have a view,
14"tcommon law there need be no limitation .. . upon the judicial powver
to order a view." 4 WirmoRE, EVIDENCE § 1163. See id. n.8, for statements

by the American courts on what is a proper case.
15 For a list of such cases, see 4 WiGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 1169 n.1 with
Supplement.
16 4 WiGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 1163.

lt Hardman, supra note 1, at 103-104 (n.3) where the following is added:
"Similarly, too, in an interesting federal case in the southern district of West
Virginia, in a decision by the late judge McClintic, the judge personally took a
view of the scene and concluded that on his own examination and from the
(other) evidence, an alleged fact was impossible. See United States v. Fanning

6 F. Supp. 412 (S.D. W. Va. 1934)."
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then the question whether what the judge so observes on the view
can be considered as evidence, arises and this question was raised
but not answered, in the principal case.18 The authoritative writers
apparently feel the same rule of law should apply on this question
whether the view is by a judge sitting in lieu of a jury or by the
jury sitting as the trier of fact. 19 From the language of the court
in the principal case, 20 it appears that the court is also of the opinion
that the same rule should apply whether the judge or jury is the
trier of fact,2 1 that rule being that the matters observed upon a

view are "to be considered as evidence, together with the other
evidence in the case."22 Although the court states that such matters

are evidence, it further states that "such evidence [matters observed
upon a jury view (which is the same as a judges view) ] is insufficient of itself to justify the trial court in entering judgment on the
basis of what the jury saw" and further that "a jury [or judges] view
will not serve to take from the party upon whom the burden of proof
lies the duty of introducing sufficient other evidence on which the
jury could properly hold that the party upon whom the burden of
proof lies has sustained that burden by evidence other than the jury
28
view."
Although the position that what a judge (or jury) observes on
a view is evidence, is the better view,24 the further proposition that
there must be sufficient other evidence, i.e., evidence other than
the view, in order that a judges finding of fact (or possibly a jury
verdict) be sustained upon appeal, appears to be less tenable and
serves no useful purpose under facts similar to the principal case
where the judge has written an opinion disclosing what facts were
observed upon his view and the opinion is made a part of the record
of the case. Upon setting aside jury verdicts (and some judge's
Is 95 S.E.2d 807, 811 (W. Va. 1956).
19 Professors Wigmore, McCormick and Dean Hardman treat both the
judge and jury as the trier of fact, together on this subject. See 4 WicmonE,
EVIDENCE: § 1168; McCouAcK, EVIDENCE § 183; Hardman, supra note 1, at
103; Hardman, The Evidentiary Effect of a View-Another Word, 58 W. VA. L.
REv. 69 (1955).
20 95 S.E.2d 807, 811 (W. Va. 1956).
21 Ibid. The court said, "This court has held.., that a view by a jury
cais to be considered as evidence, together with the other evidence in the
cas e.... A fortiori the rule should be applied in this case . . .". Also, the
excellent treatise, Hardman, supra note 1, is cited with approval by the court
which treatise also indicates that the same rule should apply to both situations.
22 95 S.E.2d 807, 811 (W. Va. 1956).
23

Ibid.

24 See Hardman, supra note 19, at 72.
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findings of fact) which are based upon a view, the reason given
by the courts is that not to set them aside would allow the view
to furnish essential evidence dehors the record.2 5 But where the
judge's opinion shows what was observed upon his view and the
opinion is made a part of the record, as in the principal case, the
court can plainly see upon what evidence the judge's finding is
based and from that determine whether the finding is based upon
sufficient evidence and under a proper factual situation, the finding
of the lower court should be affirmed even though the rule were
otherwise in the case of a jury verdict or a judge's finding of fact
where the record does not so disclose what "evidence" or matters
were observed upon the view.20 Since the record discloses the facts
observed, the reason,27 (even if it were conceded to be a valid
reason) for the rule disappears, and it is here submitted that so
should the rule disappear.
The uselessness of such a rule probably appears clearer from
the following factual situation: Say an action for trespass to land
is brought to recover damages for injuries to the land resulting from
the defendant's pumping water from his coal mine which water is
caused to run on the plaintiff's land causing erosion and creating
a gulley through the plaintiff's property, which action is being tried
before the judge sitting in lieu of a jury. Supposing it was a proper
case for a view and with the consent or presence of the parties litigants or their attorneys and/or compliance with the requisite procedure, if any (which questions are discussed later), the judge takes
a view of the premises and observes the water being pumped from
the defendant's mine and the causing of the water to unreasonably
run on to the plaintiff's land together with the resulting erosion and
injury to the plaintiff's land. Would not the observations of the
judge be sufficient "evidence"2 8 to establish the trespass and injury
to the land without the introduction of other evidence so as to establish a prima facie case requiring the defendant to come forward
25 See Chesapeake and Ohio Ry. v. Allen 113 W. Va. 691 syl. 1, 169 S.E.
610 (1933);
4 WIGMOHE, EVIDENCE § 1168.
26
hether a jury verdict or a judge's finding of fact should be upheld
upon appeal where it is based upon a view and there isnt sufficient other
evidence in the record to support it, is not to be fully discussed here but at
least one authority believes that it should. See 4 WIGMOnE, EVIDENCE §
1169 (2).
27 For cases stating that the view dehors the record, see 4 WiGMoRE,
EVIDENCE § 1169.
28 The court in the principal case recognizes the fact that matters observed
upon a view are evidence. See note 21 supra.
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with a defense as to those two points? It seems pretty clear that a
moving picture or photograph, properly introduced, showing all
of the facts stated above would be sufficient real evidence to prove
the trespass and the injury.2 9 It seems that if moving pictures or
photographs showing the requisite facts would be sufficient evidence
to sustain the court's finding of fact (or a jury verdict), then a view
of the actual thing upon which the same facts were observed would
be even more reliable evidence, 0 and therefore stronger proof of
those facts and there would be more reason to afiarm the lower court's
finding, especially where it is shown in the opinion of the judge
which was made a part of the record, that those facts were observed.
The view indicated by the court in the principal case appears
even more questionable when (as it now is in nearly every trial
court) the court's dockets are overcrowded (and the appellate courts
certainly judicially know this), and where there is a view by the
judge but the other evidence consists solely of testimonial evidence.
There the judge in order to establish a record so the appellate court
will not set aside his findings, is required to sit and listen to the
witnesses relate the facts to him which he observed and knows
from his view and which he can put in his written opinion and make
a part of the record for the appellate court, as was done in the
principal case. This is especially true where the witnesses' powers
of observation and qualifications are no greater, if as great, as the
judge's.
However desirable the rule may be that in a proper case and
under the proper procedure the finding of a judge will be upheld
where it is based solely upon a view, the language of the principal
case affords no hope that such a rule will be adopted in this state.8 1
29

1n the case, Springer v. Chicago, 135 Ill.
563, 26 N.E. 516 (1891), it
is stated, "on a trial, in a proper case, things may be exhibited to the jury,
and, if evidence of that character [pictures, photographic views, objects and
things] may be brought before the jury, upon the same principal we perceive
no good reason why a jury may not, under proper regulations established by
the court, go upon and view premises which are the subject matter of the
litigation.... Had a photograph or picture of the premises been taken, it
would have been competent evidence to go to the jury. (Emphasis added.)
If a plat or photograph of the premises would be competent evidence, why
not allow the jury to look at the property itself instead of a picture of the same?"
a0 By the use of "trick photography" pictures may be given an erroneous
impression and if such pictures get to the trier of fact, then the judge (or jury)
might very possibly be misled. However, in the case of a view, it must be
established that the premises are in substantially the same condition as at the
time in question, before the view can be had (See 4 WIGMoPE, EvMENCE §
1164 and n.2) and therefore, there is less chance that the trier of fact would

be misled.
a195 S.E.2d 807, 811-812. This is believed to be dicta.
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Although the language of the court might be construed as dicta,
under this language no careful lawyer representing a plaintiff would
rely upon facts observed upon a view without also introducing
32
sufficient other evidence to sustain the burden of proof.

It is also to be noted from the facts of the principal case that
the judge took a view of the premises involved upon his own volition and without the consent or presence of the parties litigant or
their attorneys. This raises the question as to the procedural re84
quirements of a view by a judge. 38 Under the Massachusetts view,
the power of the judge sitting in lieu of a jury to take a view would
appear to be the same as in the case of a jury.3 5 If the power of
the court to take a view is considered to be a part of its inherent
common law power, and if in the case of a judge sitting in lieu of
a jury in West Virginia this common law power has been left unchanged by statute (which is the better rule), then the power of
the court to order a view appears to be broad and almost unlimited.3 6 Therefore, the court could order a view upon its own motion
and without the consent of the parties litigant or even over their
37
objections, if it were a proper case for a view at common law,
and the other requirements (which are hereinafter discussed)
were met.
Although the power to order a view seems to be very broad
at common law, some courts have required that in the exercise of
this common law power, the court should give the parties notice of
when the view was to be taken and allow the parties and/or their
attorneys to be present.3 8 Other courts have said that the requirements of notice and an opportunity to be present at the view is
discretionary with the trial court although notice should be given. 9
32

This might be simply a bard case causing the court to state some bad

legal principles as dicta.
33
This is not repetitiousl Previously we discussed whether a judge had the
power to take a view under any circumstances. Here we are discussing when
and how the judge can take a view-the procedural requisites.
34 See note 17 supra.
35
Since a view by a judge sitting in lieu of a jury is included within the
statute providing for a view by a jury, then it would logically follow that all
provisions applying to jury views would also apply to a judge's view.
36
See 4 WiOMoRE, EVwENCE 272.
37 See 4 WIGMoRE, EvIDENcE § 1163 n.8, for what is a proper case for a
view in the United States.
3
8 Denver Omnibus and Cab Co. v. J. R. Ward Co., 47 Colo. 446, 107
Pac. 1073 (1910); Elston v. McGlauflin, 79 Wash. 335, 140 Pac. 396 (1914).
39
Adalex Const. Co. v. Atkins, 214 Ala. 53, 106 So. 338 (1935); Carter v.
Parsons, 136 Neb. 515,286 N.W. 696 (1939).
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There evidently have been instances, as in the principal case, where
the judge has taken an ex parte view with no notice to the parties
or an opportunity to be present at the taking of the view.40 Professor Wigmore evidently favors the latter view that a judge's finding should stand where it is based upon an ex parte view with no
notice or opportunity for the parties to be present. 41 But his statements indicate that his interpretation of the decisions require that
notice be given and an opportunity for the parties to be present
at the view.42 This would seem to be the better rule; 43 also, the
court in the principal case seems to indicate that it would require
the consent or presence of the parties litigant or their attorneys. 44
In the principal case the court said that the judgment of the trial
court should be reversed for the "reason alone? that "the trial Judge,
having decided the case on the basis of his view alone, has not, so
far as the record in this [the appellate] Court is concerned, decided
this case in a manner which would permit the court to give a proper
review of the case,"45 but under the facts and what the court did
in fact 46 the holding of the case seems to be better stated by the
court in point one of the syllabus in which the court said:
"In a proceeding ... pertaining to the ascertainment and
designation of boundary lines between coterminus landowners,
which has been instituted to establish a disputed boundary
line, it is reversible error for the Judge of the trial court, acting
in lieu of a jury, who has taken a view of the property of the
coterminus owners, whose boundary line is in dispute in the
40
41

See 4 WiGmom,
Ibid.

EVmENcE

§ 1169 (2) n.2.

42 4 WiGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 1169 (1).

43 If the parties or their attorneys were present, the possibility that the

court might view the wrong

property or thing would be reduced; also, it might
possibly aid the parties in the presentation of their other evidence and especially

since matters observed upon a view are evidence to be considered by the judge

sitting in lieu of a jury (or a judge), the other evidence might be more limited
than otherwise, which would save the courts time and the matter certainly
could be more easily explained if the attorneys knew what the trier of fact had
seen. Any slight changes in the condition of the thing or place viewed might
be explained away if the parties know what was observed. Also since matters

observed upon a view are properly considered as evidence (see note 21 supra)
it appears that the proceeding should be the same as any other procedure for

taking evidence, and in general evidence may not be taken without notice to
the parties and an opportunity for the parties to be present Lastly, such a
procedure appears to be more of a judicial character and has more of the basic
elements (notice and an opportunity to be present) of justice and fair play

which is necessary to uphold the prestige of our courts.
44 95 S.E.2d 807, 811-812.
45 Id.at 812.
46 This is the law of a case. See note 6 supra.
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proceeding, to enter a judgment 47establishing the true boundary
line based solely on such view."
In a situation such as the principal case, where the trial court
is called upon to determine the true boundary between coterminus
tracts of land, it seems unlikely that there could be a factual situation where the boundary could be determined solely by a view of
a judge (or jury), for this is a matter that generally requires the
expert testimony of a surveyor or engineer, or the question can be
determined solely on the basis of the deeds, or a combination of
the two.4 8 But a view, although it might be helpful in deciding
the case,4 9 could hardly show the true boundary since an owner of
real property can establish the boundary anywhere he wishes, however foolhardy it might be. Also, the law of real property requires
the true boundary to be where it actually is regardless of any
topographical or observable position or condition of the land.50
Therefore, the final result in the principal case appears to be correct.
R. W. F.

47
'Whether or not the syllabus is the law in West Virginia is not being
discussed here. On this question, see Hardman, "The Law"-In West Virginia,
47 W. VA. L.Q. 23 (1940); "The Syllabus Is the Law", 47 W. VA. L.Q. 141
(1941); "The Syllabus Is the Law"-Another Word, 47 W. VA. L.Q. 209 (1921 ;
"The4Syllabus Is the Law"--Another Word by Fox, J., 48 W. VA. L.Q. 55 (1941).
8 This is what the court in the principal case did.
4 Some courts say that a view is only to "enable the jury, by the view of
the premises or place, to better understand and comprehend the testimony of
the witnesses respecting the same, and thereby the more intelligently to apply

the testimony to the issues on trial before them . . ." See Close v. Samm, 27
Ia. 508 (1869); 4 WIOmoRE, EVmNNCE § 1168. A view certainly could do this.

50 The court in the principal case seems to follow this rule of real property.
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